Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards

Reinforcement learning systems fundamentally rely on reward signals to guide policy optimization. However, the integrity of these signals represents a critical vulnerability in deployed RL systems, particularly in adversarial or high-stakes environments.

Problem Formulation

In standard RL frameworks, an agent interacts with an environment according to the following protocol:

  • Agent executes action ata_t in state sts_t
  • Environment returns reward rtr_t and next state st+1s_{t+1}
  • Agent updates policy π\pi based on (st,at,rt,st+1)(s_t, a_t, r_t, s_{t+1})

The critical assumption here is that rtr_t accurately reflects the true reward function R(s,a)R(s,a). This assumption breaks down in several scenarios:

  1. Adversarial manipulation: External actors inject false reward signals
  2. Environment corruption: System faults produce incorrect rewards
  3. Reward hacking: Agents exploit implementation bugs to generate unearned rewards

Verifiable Reward Architecture

A verifiable reward system augments the standard RL protocol with cryptographic proofs. Formally, the environment now returns a tuple (rt,πt)(r_t, \pi_t) where:

  • rtr_t is the claimed reward
  • πt\pi_t is a proof that rt=R(st,at)r_t = R(s_t, a_t) for predetermined RR

The agent only accepts rewards that satisfy a verification predicate V(rt,πt,st,at)=1V(r_t, \pi_t, s_t, a_t) = 1.

Implementation Components

The construction typically employs three cryptographic primitives:

1. Commitment Schemes

The environment commits to reward function RR at initialization using a binding commitment scheme:

C=Commit(R,r) where r is randomnessC = \text{Commit}(R, r) \text{ where } r \text{ is randomness}

This commitment is shared with the agent before training begins.

2. Zero-Knowledge Proof Systems

For each reward calculation, the environment generates a proof π\pi demonstrating:

  • Knowledge of RR such that Open(C,R,r)=1\text{Open}(C, R, r) = 1
  • rt=R(st,at)r_t = R(s_t, a_t)
  • Auxiliary constraints (e.g., valid state transitions)

Modern implementations leverage succinct proof systems (SNARKs/STARKs) to achieve:

  • Proof size: O(logn)O(\log n) or O(1)O(1)
  • Verification time: O(logn)O(\log n) or O(1)O(1)
  • Prover time: O(nlogn)O(n \log n) where nn is circuit size

3. State Authentication

To prevent replay attacks, states must be authenticated:

ht=H(sttnonce)h_t = H(s_t \parallel t \parallel \text{nonce})

Where HH is a collision-resistant hash function. The proof π\pi must demonstrate consistency with hth_t.

Computational Complexity Analysis

The overhead introduced by verification depends on several factors:

ComponentStandard RLVerifiable RL
Reward computationO(f)O(f)O(f)O(f)
Proof generation-O(flogf)O(f \log f)
Proof size-O(logf)O(\log f)
Verification-O(logf)O(\log f)

Where ff represents the complexity of the reward function. For polynomial-time reward functions, proof generation remains tractable.

Application Domains

Several domains exhibit characteristics that make verifiable rewards particularly relevant:

Autonomous Systems

In safety-critical applications, reward integrity directly impacts system reliability:

  • Sensor verification: Cryptographic attestation of sensor readings
  • Action verification: Proofs that executed actions match commanded actions
  • Safety constraints: Verifiable compliance with safety specifications

Financial Trading

Trading environments require strong guarantees about profit calculations:

R(s,a)=P(portfolioafter)P(portfoliobefore)costs(a)R(s,a) = P(\text{portfolio}_\text{after}) - P(\text{portfolio}_\text{before}) - \text{costs}(a)

The proof must demonstrate correct price data and transaction execution.

Federated Learning

When multiple parties contribute to training:

  • Each participant generates proofs for local rewards
  • Aggregator verifies all proofs before global update
  • Prevents poisoning attacks through reward manipulation

Security Properties

A properly implemented verifiable reward system provides:

  1. Soundness: Invalid rewards are rejected with high probability
  2. Completeness: Valid rewards are always accepted
  3. Zero-knowledge: Proofs reveal nothing beyond reward validity
  4. Non-malleability: Proofs cannot be modified to verify different rewards

The security reduces to the underlying cryptographic assumptions (e.g., discrete log, knowledge-of-exponent).

Performance Optimizations

Recent work has identified several optimization strategies:

Batch Verification

Aggregate multiple proofs into a single verification:

V(r1...rn,πbatch) instead of V(ri,πi) for each iV(r_1...r_n, \pi_{\text{batch}}) \text{ instead of } V(r_i, \pi_i) \text{ for each } i

This amortizes verification costs across episodes.

Proof Composition

Complex reward functions can be decomposed:

R(s,a)=R1(s,a)+R2(s,a)R(s,a) = R_1(s,a) + R_2(s,a) π=(π1,π2) where πi proves Ri\pi = (\pi_1, \pi_2) \text{ where } \pi_i \text{ proves } R_i

Enables parallel proof generation and modular verification.

Hardware Acceleration

Specialized hardware (FPGAs, ASICs) can accelerate:

  • Field arithmetic for elliptic curve operations
  • Multi-scalar multiplication
  • FFT-based polynomial operations

Open Research Questions

The intersection of cryptography and RL presents numerous open problems:

  1. Adaptive proof systems: Can proof complexity adapt to reward function complexity?
  2. Privacy-preserving rewards: How to verify rewards without revealing sensitive state information?
  3. Continuous verification: Efficient verification for continuous action/state spaces
  4. Proof-of-learning: Extending beyond rewards to verify entire learning trajectories

Conclusion

Verifiable rewards represent a natural evolution in RL system design. As deployment contexts become more adversarial and stakes increase, cryptographic verification transitions from theoretical interest to practical necessity. The computational overhead, while non-trivial, is increasingly manageable given advances in proof systems and hardware acceleration.

The key insight remains: in environments where reward integrity matters, the cost of verification is often negligible compared to the cost of manipulation.